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FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND SOCIAL UNITY: GORDON
WOOD'S "CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION"
WILLIAM

A. GALSTON*

I have no quarrel with the broad outlines of Gordon Wood's account of republicanism in the American revolution. Rather than registering dissent over details, I want to use this opportunity to reflect on the
significance of his account (which is considerable) for the topic of this
Symposium and for our understanding of contemporary American
politics.
The central eighteenth-century concern that Wood's article addresses may be stated as a question: What is it that binds members of a
polity together and makes possible a common life? By way of answer,
Wood's story offers a descending triad. The "classical" republicanism of
the early eighteenth-century, still visible at the time of the Revolution in
the thought of John Adams, revolved around public virtue--citizens' capacity to set private interest aside and devote themselves wholeheartedly
to the common good. By the mid-eighteenth century, this brand of republicanism had been supplemented, and in some measure displaced, by
what might be termed "affective" republicanism, which emphasized benevolence, fellow-feeling, and the corresponding private virtues as the
prime source of community. For American constitutional politics of the
late eighteenth century, by contrast, the emphasis on virtue (whether
public or private) was to a significant degree overlaid by a novel focus on
the artful arrangement of personal and group interests.
Overlaid, but not replaced. According to Wood, both classical and
affective republicanism have left important residua in the American
mind. From classical republicanism, we have inherited our belief in
equality and distaste for pretense and privilege; our yearning for individual autonomy and quest for freedom from dependency; our continuing
hope for truly disinterested leaders and conversely, our periodic revulsion from politicians whose exploitation of public office for private gain is
condemned as corruption; and the continuing obsession with our national virtue, which (as Wood drily remarks) "still bewilders the rest of
* Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, and Senior
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the world."' From affective republicanism we derive our view of government as (at best) a necessary evil; our understanding of private society as
the prime arena of virtue and mutual regard; our belief in a kind of mildness and decency as core social virtues; and our desire for the unity of
emotional intimacy and warmth. As Wood puts it, "[w]e still yearn for a
'2
world in which everyone will love one another."
On its face, Wood's presentation suggests two propositions of great
significance. First, by the early nineteenth century (at the latest) there
was virtually no trace left in America of the normatively privileged position, established by classical republicanism, for direct political participation. Post-revolutionary America, that is, had quickly shed the sense of
politics as an intrinsically elevated activity (though exemplary leaders
were a perennial possibility) and the belief that political involvement was
essential to personal development and satisfaction. A residuum of classical republicanism remained, of course, and is available even today for
reappropriation by "civic republicans."' 3 But it is nothing like the dominant American view.
Second, the simple opposition characteristic of much recent scholarship between a participatory, public virtue-based classical republicanism
and a purely interest-based modern liberalism is much too simple. There
is a third possibility: an understanding of the virtues compatible with,
necessary for, and in some measure evoked by the operation of a diverse,
dynamic commercial society. These virtues might, with equal justice, be
called "modern republican" or "liberal." However they are denominated, it is of utmost importance to describe them with some specificity,
for they are the virtues we most require here and now. The question of
whether contemporary Americans could function successfully as citizens
of Sparta (or Swiss cantons, for that matter) is not very important, but
the question of whether contemporary culture tends to foster or repress
4
the virtues needed to sustain free institutions is vital by any measure.
One of the advantages of Wood's schema is that it enables us to pose
a series of questions about classical republicanism. Four seem especially
germane for our purposes, and I will devote the remainder of my article
to them.
1. Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 38
(1990).
2. Id. at 33.
3. For some skeptical comments on this reappropriative movement, see Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986).
4. For ruminations on all this, see Galston, Liberal Virtues, 82 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 1277
(1988) and Galston, Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State, 19 PS 807 (1986).
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I.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSICAL

REPUBLICANISM, AS WOOD PRESENTS IT, AND GREEK
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?

Wood's classical republicanism is predominantly Roman in inspiration. More specifically, it draws upon the events of the two centuries
from the breakdown of the Republic to the reign of Marcus Aurelius.
The writers most cited by eighteenth century classical republicans represent the Roman senatorial opposition to imperial rule-the spirit of aristocratic highmindedness and independence, and of heroic (if ultimately
futile) self-sacrifice.
Where these Roman writers are clear and direct, Greek political
philosophy is complex. Consider, for example, the ambiguous status of
aristocratic public involvement in Plato and Aristotle vis-a-vis private
contemplation; or the difficulties posed for an ethic of self-sacrifice by
Platonic-Aristotelian moral theories based on self-development rightly
understood; or the obstacles to a theory of the common good created by
what Plato and Aristotle saw as deep and politically decisive divisions of
interest and psychology, even within relatively small communities like
the polis. These problems come to a head in the Platonic-Aristotelian
depiction of Sparta, which is at least as critical as it is approving. All of
which says we cannot presuppose anything like a seamless republican
tradition stretching from Greece to Rome-let alone from classical antiquity to Renaissance Italy.
II.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSICAL

REPUBLICANISM AS WOOD PRESENTS IT AND ITS MIDEIGHTEENTH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION INTO
AFFECTIVE REPUBLICANISM?

The evidence compels us to answer: distant at best. Classical republicanism is rooted in the small republic (or least republics in which the
number of politically relevant actors is relatively limited) while affective
republicanism reflects the early modem experience of emerging nationstates. Classical republicanism is a public ethic of martial virtue most
suited to war and the threat of war; affective republicanism is a sustained
ode to peace and the pacific character. Classical republicanism praises
severity of manners, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice, while affective republicanism inclines toward mildness, softness, and self-expression. The
virtues of classical republicanism are almost wholly male, while those of
affective republicanism are female in at least equal measure. Classical
republicanism embodies an anti-commercial bias, while affective republi-
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canism accommodates itself to, or even affirmatively embraces, commercial activities and traits of character. Finally, classical republicanism
espouses the primacy of political association and public deeds; affective
republicanism gives pride of place to social relations.
As Wood depicts it, the emerging republicanism of the mid-eighteenth century seems to have far more in common with the liberal tradition (and even with Hobbes) than with classical republicanism. One is
led to wonder, in fact, just what it is that the two forms of republicanism
have left to share beyond the core concerns with the bonds of human
connection and with the virtues.
This perplexity is brought to a head in Wood's treatment of Cato.
Within the classical republican tradition, he remarks, "Cicero and Cato
....were the Romans to be admired ....It was almost always classical
standards-Catonic and Ciceronian standards-that British opposition
writers invoked to judge the ragged world of eighteenth-century politics."' 5 But for affective republicanism, matters were completely different. According to Wood, "the powerful appeal of Addison's play Cato
could scarcely have rested on the austere and self-denying character of
Cato himself. The hero's forbidding sternness and his inexorable suicide
on behalf of liberty represented behavior not easily emulated by the prosperous and civilized audiences of the eighteenth century."' 6 Wood goes
on to contrast Cato with Addison's Prince Juba, the affective republican
hero of mildness, sociability, and civilization in opposition to martial
fierceness and severity. The gulf of moral sensibility separating the older
from the newer republicanism could hardly be more vividly exemplified.
III.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSICAL

REPUBLICANISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM?

There are several reasons to doubt that this relationship is very intimate. To begin with, the title of Wood's article calls our attention to
republican influences on the American Revolution. But it is Wood himself who has taught us to recognize a fundamental shift from the Revolutionary mind to that of the federal constitution-makers. 7 Early in his
present argument, Wood invokes Franco Venturi's distinction between a
political outlook as "form of government" versus "form of life." 8 In the
5. Wood, supra note 1, at 21-22.
6. Id. at 32. In this connection, it is noteworthy that when Rousseau in the Fn'sT DiscOURsE
penned his memorable protest against the politics and morals of mildness, politeness, and commerce,
he found it altogether natural to invoke Cato as witness for the prosecution.
7. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972).
8. Wood, supra note 1, at 14.
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American context, anyway, classical republicanism is (at most) the latter
rather than the former: a language of critical distance and social protest
rather than a source of laws and socio-political institutions. Witness the
fate of John Adams, one of the last prominent Americans to attempt the
use of classical republicanism as an affirmative guide for social
reconstruction. 9
Several other phenomena point in the same direction, to the relative
marginalization of classical republicanism in the constitutional epoch.
Notable in this connection is the rising importance after 1760 of the vocabulary of individual rights as a language of protest against tyranny. Of
equal importance during the same period is the increasing intellectual
importance of individual interests, deployed in opposition both to virtue
as the basis of individual motivation and to homogeneity as the centerpiece of social reality. Finally, doubts about Greece and Rome as suitable models for America culminate in the severely negative judgments on
classical politics expressed in Federalist papers six through nine.
This is not to say that all traces of classical republicanism were expunged from the constitutional understanding by 1787. Some important
residua remained: a conception of the common good, as distinct from the
vector-sum of clashing private and group interests; a continuing belief in
the possibility of disinterested virtue in public leaders; and a notion of a
distinctive socio-economic base (the leisured landed gentry) as the prime
source for such leaders. Still, as Wood has elsewhere shown, the half
century after the ratification of the Constitution witnessed the progressive evisceration of even these traces of classical republicanism through
the commercial democratization of American society.10 What remained
of it by Andrew Jackson's presidency has to be regarded as pretty thin
gruel.
IV.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSICAL
REPUBLICANISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY "CIVIC
REPUBLICAN" REVIVAL?

Like the classical republicanism of the early modem period, contemporary civic republicanism is more a form of life-a language of protest
and social criticism-than it is an affirmative program of legal and institutional reconstruction. As more than one commentator has noted, civic
republicans tend to be very reticent about describing the practical differ9. Again, Wood himself is our most reliable guide on this point. See G. WOOD, supra note 7.
10. Wood, The Democratizationof Mind in the American Revolution, in THE MORAL FOUNDA'TIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 102 (R. Horwitz ed. 1977).
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ences their critical views would entail.II
There are, of course, distinctions between these forms of republicanism corresponding to the differing objects of their protest. The classical
republicanism of the eighteenth century was directed against the dangerous tendencies of monarchy-in particular, the risks of corruption and of
arbitrary authority or tyranny. While these anti-monarchic concerns are
hardly extinct today, contemporary civic republicanism is directed for
the most part against what it sees as the negative features of liberalism:
socio-economic inequalities; structural inadequacies of, and selective exclusions from, full political participation; the progressive commercialization of all domains of life, including politics and the family; relatedly, a
mounting privatization and depoliticization of our collective existence;
and finally, an ever-increasing social fragmentation that renders collective action ever more difficult by undermining the unity of purpose,
spirit, and sympathy on which it rests.
Contemporary civic republicanism, then, seeks a far greater measure
of political participation, of individual equality, and of social unity than
seems readily achievable within a strictly liberal framework. In its focus
on participation and unity, civic republicanism bears at least a family
resemblance to its classical forebear, but its much enhanced emphasis on
equality and inclusion sets it apart as a distinctly contemporary
phenomenon.
It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, this orientation
can move from the discourse of protest to constructive alternatives. This
challenge is deepened by the circumstances in which contemporary republicanism must act: the extended republic, a commercial market economy, a highly diverse society, disagreement about the normative status of
political participation, and deep mistrust of a character-centered politics
and an inclination to rely instead on procedures, institutions, and what
'1 2
James Madison termed "auxiliary precautions."
The classical norms of social unity and of virtue as self-sacrificial
devotion to the common good rested on war and the threat of war. But
liberal societies prize peace above all, and prosperity as the means for
dampening civil discord and preserving internal tranquility in the face of
deep social and moral differences. One may well wonder how far con11. See Herzog, supra note 3, at 481-82; Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); W. KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, & CULTURE 47-99

(1989). There are honorable exceptions, Professor Cass Sunstein perhaps chief among them. See
Sunstein, Republicanism and the Preference Problem, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 181 (1990), and Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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temporary civic republicanism can go in practice before it runs up
against the limits imposed by these core liberal commitments.

